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overlapping programs, often involving multiple agencies and
diverse criteria. This results in confusion at the local level, in
the waste of time, energy and resources, and often in the
frustration of the intent of Congress."'
VII.

FUTURE OF WELFARE

Although neither federal nor state government has completely
accepted the theory that support is an obligation upon society and
a right for the individual, federal expansion of entitlement could
be precipitated in the near future under the President's Welfare
Reform Program. The future of the welfare system as a whole
appears to be a completely open question. Regardless of the
legislative enactments to come from the President's proposal, the
initiative is moving away from the states, leaving them with little
more than expense. Establishment of a national income floor
might remove, by application of the Equal Protection Clause, the
one drastic final option left to them-withdrawal from the jointlyfunded program. Drawn between Shapiro and the new welfare
reforms proposed, the state capitals must watch and wait.
EDWARD I. MEARS

CRIMINAL LAW-ARREST-RESISTING
PUNISHABLE AS A MISDEMEANOR

CODE SECTION

AN UNLAWFUL ARREST

UNDER CALIFORNIA

PENAL

834A. People v. Curtis (Cal. 1969).

The defendant was arrested on the street at night by a police
officer in uniform. The officer was investigating a report of a
prowler and had received a brief, general description of the suspect
as a male Negro, about six feet tall, wearing a white shirt and tan
trousers. The defendant matched this description. After telling the
defendant that he was under arrest and would have to come with
him, the officer reached for the defendant's arm. The defendant
attempted to back away and a violent struggle ensued in which
both men were injured. The defendant was subdued and taken into
custody by several other officers. In the Superior Court, the
defendant was acquitted of a charge of burglary, but was
convicted of a battery upon a peace officer, a felony.' The Court
40.
I.

See note 36, supra [emphasis supplied].

§ 243 (West Supp. 1968):
A battery is punishible by fine of not exceeding one thousand dollars

CAL. PENAL CODE

19701

RECENT CASES

of Appeal affirmed in part and reversed in part.2 The Supreme
Court of California held, reversed; a person may not use force to
resist any arrest, lawful or unlawful, except to defend life and limb
against excessive force; but if it is determined that the resistance
was to a lawful arrest and was not justified, the defendant is guilty
of a felony; and if the arrest is determined to be unlawful the
defendant may be convicted only of a misdemeanor.3 People v.
Curtis,70 Adv. Cal. 360, 450 P.2d 33, 74 Cal. Rptr. 713 (1969).
At common law, while there is no right to resist a lawful
arrest, reasonable resistance could be made to an unlawful arrest
and the use of excessive force in making an arrest-whether lawful
or unlawful. The privilege to resist an unlawful arrest was based
upon factors which have little application today. Historically, an

arrest had certain consequences of long and arduous incarceration
under primitive conditions with doubtful opportunity for early

release and little or no remedy for the unfortunate victim if the
arrest proved to be unlawful. Under modern law and judicial

procedure the situation has changed. First, and foremost, the
victim of an unlawful arrest does have a remedy at law. The

statutory and judicially imposed safeguards are generally adequate
to protect the innocent victim from more than temporary
inconvenience. Second, since the early nineteenth century the

development of modern police departments and methods has
greatly increased the hazards of resisting arrest by a well-armed

and equipped peace officer. Finally, in modern society the hazards
to public welfare by permitting resistance to arrest have been
increased .!
(S1,000), or by imprisonment in the county jail not exceeding six months or
both. When it is committed against the person of a peace officer or fireman,
and the person committing the offense knows or reasonably should know that
the victim is a peace officer or a fireman engaged in the performance of his
duties, and such peace officer or fireman is engaged in the performance of his
duties, the offense shall be punished by imprisonment in the county jail not
exceeding one year or by imprisonment in the state prison for not less than I
nor more than 10 years.
2. 264 Adv. Cal. App. 179,70 Cal. Rptr. 271 (1968).
3. Also at issue, but not discussed herein, was the contention by the defendant that
the record of a constitutionally invalid prior conviction had been improperly admitted. The
court held that the constitutionality of a prior conviction is to be determined by the court
and not by the jury and that it is without significance that the issue arises during rather
than before trial so long as the objection is raised before the case is submitted to the jury.
For the appropriate means of making the determination, the court referred to the
procedure outlined in People v. Coffey, 67 Cal. 2d 204, 217-18, 430 P.2d 15, 24, 60 Cal.
Rptr. 457, 467 (1967).
4. For a detailed discussion of the history of the common law rule and its
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Partly as a product of this change in the nature of society,

the Uniform Arrest Act s was developed to modernize arrest
procedures in keeping with current social and political conditions.
This act took cognizance of the anomaly of the common law

privilege in today's society by removing the right to use
reasonable force to resist an unlawful arrest.'
Prior to 1957 the common law rule was recognized in

California courts. 7 In that year, the legislature added Section 834a
to the Penal Code, in consonance with the Uniform Arrest Act,

providing that it is the duty of every citizen to refrain from
resisting arrest by a "recognized" peace officer.8 The wording of

the California code provision varied from that of the Uniform
Arrest Act, in omitting the phrase which prohibited resistance
whether or not there was a legal basis for the arrest.

In 1961, section 834a of the California Penal Code was
interpreted in People v. Burns9 as extending the prohibition

against resistance to both lawful and unlawful arrests. The court
in Burns, drawing on the legislative history of section 834a found
support in the avowed intent of the legislature.' 0

Prior to Curtis, this interpretation of section 834a had not
received a thorough review by the Supreme Court of California.
The court apparently approved Burns in People v. Coffey."

However, in Coffey reference was by footnote in a case which did
not involve unlawful arrest and, therefore, can scarcely be

considered as an unequivocal affirmation of the interpretation
made by the Burns court. In Curtis the court reviews the

interpretation of section 834a and specifically affirms the view
that the section applies to both lawful and unlawful arrests.
inappropriateness in modern society, see. e.g., Comment, 7 NATURAL RimSOURCES J. 119
(1967).
5. Warren, The Uniform Arrest Act, 28 VA. L. Rav. 315 (1942).
6. Id. at 345. Section 5 of the Uniform Arrest Act provides: "If a person has
reasonable ground to believe that he is being arrested by a peace officer, it is his duty to
refrain from using force or any weapon in resisting arrest regardless of whether or not there
is a legal basis for the arrest."
7. E.g., People v. Spinosa, 115 Cal. App. 2d 659, 665, 252 P.2d 409,412 (1953).
8. CAL, PENAL CODE § 834a (vest Supp. 1968): "If a person has knowledge, or
by the exercise of reasonable care, should have knowledge, that he is being arrested by a
peace officer, it is the duty of such person to refrain from using force or any weapon to
resist such arrest."
9. 198 Cal. App. 2d 839, 18 Cal. Rptr. 921 (1961).
10. Id. at 841.42, 18 Cal. Rptr. at 922-23.
11. 67 Cal. 2d at 221 n.18,430 P.2d at 26 n.18, 60 Cal. Rptr. at 468 n.18.
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The Curtis court follows the Burns reasoning in basing its
decision on legislative intent.12 It also (apparently) gives great
weight to the fact that the Burns interpretation has had a long
history of adoption. 13 The contention that the Burns interpretation
violates the rights of the victim of -an unlawful arrest is considered
but rejected." Overall, however, the Curtis court seems to be
persuaded most strongly by stare decisis in concluding
that section
15
834a applies to unlawful as well as lawful arrests.
The opinion suggests that had the question of interpretation
of section 834a been one of first impression, the court might have
been persuaded to exclude unlawful arrest from the scope of
section 834a.1 This gives rise to the unsettling feeling that Burns,
as affirmed by Curtis, might easily be subject to reversal in a
future case where the determination rested solely on the
interpretation of section 834a.
It must be admited, at the very least, that the legislature
adopted a peculiar way of signifying its intent by omitting the very
words which would have extended section 834a to unlawful arrests
without doubt or equivocation. Moreover, as the Curtis court
recognizes but rejects, 17 the juxtaposition of section 834a with
section 83418 (which clearly relates only to lawful arrests) would,
in most circumstances, be persuasive. Of course, if section 834a
applies only to lawful arrests its purpose is obscure unless the
legislature intended it merely as a codification of the common law
rule.
Accepting the interpretation of section 834a as applying to
unlawful as well as lawful arrest, the question then arises as to
what crime is committed by the violation of section 834a. It does
not establish a new substantive crime, 9 nor was it intended to do
so in its original form in the Uniform Arrest Act.20 In Curtis, the
12. E.g., REPORT OF THE SENATE INTERIM JUDICIARY COMMITTEE, Appendix to
Journal of the Senate, vol. I at 435-36, 456 (1957).
13. 70 Adv. Cal. at 364, 450 P.2d at 35,74 Cal. Rptr. at 715.
14. Id. at 365-66, 450 P.2d at 36,74 Cal. Rptr. at 716-17.
15. Id. at 364, 450 P.2d at 35, 74 Cal. Rptr. at 715.
16. Id. at 364 n.2, 450 P.2d at 35 n.2, 74 Cal. Rptr. at 715 n.2.
17. Id. at 364-65 n. I & 2, 450 P.2d at 35 n.l &2, 74 Cal. Rptr. at 715 n.l & 2.
18. CAL. PENAL CODE § 834 (West Supp. 1968): "An arrest is taking a person into
custody, in a case and in a manner authorized by law. An arrest may be made by a peace
officer or by a private person."
19. 70 Adv. Cal. at 367, 450 P.2d at 37, 74 Cal. Rptr. at 717.
20. See, Warren, supra note 5, at 330.
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result of the violation was a battery and the appropriate charge
would be that of battery as defined elsewhere in the Penal Code.
At the time section 834a was adopted, section 243 of the Penal
Code setting the punishment for battery established the offense as
a misdemeanor.2 At that time there would have been no problem
such as in Curtis. Subsequent amendments to section 243 divided
battery into two distinct offenses: first, the former misdemeanor
("simply battery") and second, the more serious offense of
"felony battery" when committed against a peace officer. 22 Thus,
the dilemma arises: is a violation of section 834a resulting in a
battery to be punished under the simple battery provisions of
section 243 or under the felony battery provisions?
The key to this dilemma as decided by the Curtis court lies
in the statutory language "engaged in the performance of his
duties".? The court points out that the peace officer's duty as
embodied in section 243 had a logical predecessor in the duty
concept of section 148.24 The latter section has been a part of the
Penal Code since 1872. It is well settled by the courts that the duty
to arrest of section 148 applies only to lawful arrests.2 5 It is
consistent to adopt the same meaning for the duty concept of
section 243. On this basis, the court reasons that "even if section
834a now makes it a citizen's duty not to resist an unlawful arrest,
this change in the law in no way purports to include an unlawful
arrest within the performance of an officer's duty."2
Applying this reasoning to the facts in Curtis, the court
concluded that the arrest was unlawful in that the police officer
lacked probable cause sufficient to justify an arrest. Applying the
doctrine of Terry v. Ohio2 and People v. Mickelson, 5 the court
21. CAL. PENAL CODE § 243 (\vest 1955) as it existed in 1957: "A battery is
punishible by fine of not exceeding one thousand dollars, or by imprisonment in the county
jail not exceeding six months, or by both."
22. Compare wording in notes I and 21, supra.
23. 70 Adv. Cal. at 366-67, 450 P.2d at 37,74 Cal. Rptr. at 717.
24. CAL. PENAL CODE § 148 (West Supp. 1968).
Every person who wilfully resists, delays, or obstructs any public officer,
in the discharge or attempt to discharge any duty of his office, when no other
punishment is prescribed, is punishable by a fine not exceeding one thousand
dollars, or by imprisonment in a county jail not exceeding one year, or both
such fine and imprisonment.
25. E.g., "An officer is under no duty to make an unlawful arrest." Jackson v.
Superior Court, 98 Cal. App. 2d 183, 189, 219 P.2d 879, 883 (1950).
26. 70 Adv. Cal. at 367, 450 P.2d at 37, 74 Cal. Rptr. at 717.
27. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
28. 59 Cal. 2d 448, 380 P.2d 658, 30 Cal. Rptr. 18 (1963).

1970]

RECENT CASES

conceded that the police officer did have sufficient grounds to
detain and question the defendant.2 9 The facts demonstrate,
however, that an arrest was actually made. Being unlawful, the
arrest did not fall within the duty of the officer. The offense
committed by the defendant in resisting arrest was at most a
simple battery rather than a felony battery committed against a
peace officer in the performance of his duty. In so holding, the
court specifically overruled cases which either held or implied a
contrary view.30 The cases overruled include not only cases under
section 243 but also cases under other provisions of the Penal
Code3' which have similar dual punishment provisions since the
same reasoning applies to all.
Two other statements by the court in Curtis are worthy of
note. First, the court emphasizes the distinction, long recognized
but frequently forgotten, between resisting an unlawful arrest and
32
resisting the use of unreasonable force in effecting any arrest.
The latter is a separate and distinct right granted by other sections
of the Penal Code3 and is not abrogated by section 834a or by
the reasoning in Curtis. Second, the court warns that the
definition of the duty of a peace officer adopted for the purpose
of the Curtis decision does not necessarily extend to all other
provisions of the Penal Code.3 4 Both Distinctions are important
in attempting to apply the rule of Curtis to other fact situatioins.
It is clear from Curtis that under California law a citizen
who resists arrest by a peace officer is chargeable with at least a
misdemeanor whether or not there is a legal basis for the arrest.
It is also clear that the mere act of resistance to a peace officer
will not be escalated into a felony unless the arrest is lawful. A
different situation exists where the circumstances are those of
"detain and examine" rather than arrest. The Supreme Court of
29. 70 Adv. Cal. at 370-71,450 P.2d at 40,74 Cal. Rptr. at 720.
30. People v. Rhone, 267 Adv. Cal. App. 711, 73 Cal. Rptr. 463 (1968); Pittman v.
Superior Court, 256 Cal. App. 2d 795, 64 Cal. Rptr. 743 (1967); People v. Hooker, 254
Cal. App. 2d 878, 62 Cal. Rptr. 675 (1967); People v. Beca, 247 Cal. App. 2d 487, 55
Cal. Rptr. 681 (1966); People v. Gaines, 247 Cal. App. 2d 141, 55 Cal. Rptr. 283 (1966);
People v. Burns, 198 Cal. App. 2d 839, 18 Cal. Rptr. 921 (1961).
31. 70 Adv. Cal. at 370 n.9, 450 P.2d at 39 n.9, 74 Cal. Rptr, at 719 n.9. Although
not specifically mentioned by the court, the same reasoning would appear to apply to
section 241 which also contains a dual provision.
32. Id. at 369, 450 P.2d at 38-39, 74 Cal. Rptr. at 718-19.
33. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 692, 693 and 835a (West Supp. 1968).
34. 70 Adv. Cal. at 370 n.9, 450 P.2d at 39 n.9, 74 Cal. Rptr. at 720 n.9.
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California previously held that section 834a applies only to arrest
situations.3 5 If the court's reasoning on "duty" can be slightly
extended, 3 a justified detention and examination would seem to
fall within the definition of "in the performance of his duty" for
a peace officer. If so, section 834a is unnecessary since resistance
in such circumstances would fall directly within the felony battery
portion of section 243 (assuming that the result of the resistance
is a battery). Another situation unresolved by Curtis is that in
which resistance to a lesser restraint, such as detention and
examination, could give rise to a more serious offense than
resistance to an unlawful arrest.
A very troublesome problem is recognized by the Curtis
Court but left unanswered. The rationale of section 834a as
applied to unlawful arrest is tenable only if the victim has an
adequate remedy at law. As the court admits, there is a remedy,
but in reality it is often more illusory than real.3 1 In an era when
individual rights are receiving special attention, the improbability
of pursuing this remedy to judgment is unfortunate. The Curtis
decision would appear to compensate to a limited extent for the
discrepancy between the existence of a remedy on one hand and
small chance of recovery on the other.
Louis N. SAUNDERS, JR.
FAMILY LAW-CHILD SUPPORT-MOTHER
SUPPORT

PAYMENTS

TO

FATHER

WHO

MUST

GIVE

IS IN CUSTODY

OF

CHILDREN WHEN NOT DOING So WOULD RESULT IN AN
INEQUITABLE SITUATION. Moore v. Moore (Cal. App. 1969).

Jack Moore originally brought suit for divorce against his
wife, Helen. Following a cross-complaint by Helen, the parties
entered into a property settlement agreement. It was then
stipulated that the complaint, the answer to the complaint, and
the answer to the cross-complaint be withdrawn and default by
Jack Moore be entered. This agreement was approved by the court
in an interlocutory decree (July 23, 1962) and set forth in the
judgment. Custody of the children (two girls and one boy) was
35.

People v. Coffey, 67 Cal. 2d 204, 221,430 P.2d 15, 26,60 Cal. Rptr. 457,468

(1967).
36.
37.

This may be contrary to the court's warning, supra.
70 Adv. Cal. at 366, 450 P.2d at 37, 74 Cal. Rptr. at 717.

